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A Means to an End: How the Expansion of
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 by the
Supreme Court Created a Loophole for
Corporations to Avoid Claims by
Consumers and Workers Alike
Brittany L. Pushkin
Arbitration is rarely thought of outside the legal and business
world by the everyday lay person. Whether we know it or notall
of us, in some capacity, have agreed to a mandatory arbitration
clause. A contract for cellular service, an employer-employee
arrangement, or an agreement to open a bank account are just a
few common examples that lock not only clients, but also
employees, in contracts that contain mandatory arbitration
clauses. In 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act was imagined to
propel the efficiency of justice. However, the Supreme Court has
greatly expanded the scope of the Act; which, in turn, has twisted
the original intent of the Federal Arbitration Act and created a
loophole for corporations to avoid class action litigation all
together without even looking toward the merits of each case.
Allowing this kind of abuse only deprives consumers and
employees of their Seventh Amendment right to trial as mandatory
arbitration clauses only seem to become more commonplace.
Originally, the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted to create
another avenue to dispute resolution in order to speed up cases
where both parties agreed to avoid trial. Now, arbitration is a
wonderland for large companies where the world of justice is
flipped on its head and rules of evidence are thrown out without
any regard for the law. Even though arbitration is a private
dispute resolution, this should not undermine basic due process
measures. Simply because large corporations want to avoid the
expenses of the trial courts and damages, this does not mean
justice should be put on the wayside. Individuals may be left in a
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worse position after arbitration even if they come out on the
winning side.
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        you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end,
      1

I. INTRODUCTION
  "  
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . #2 Despite this
    $    -holed
into private dispute resolution.3 Mandatory arbitration clauses have
become an integral part of American life, for better or for worse. However,
although originally thought to streamline the judicial process and save the
 $ -earned money on rising litigation costs, arbitration has
become a death sentence for legal claims.4 Although the word arbitration
is freely floated around, very few individuals understand what this process
entails.5 Even more troubling, a vast majority of these individuals are
likely subject to a mandatory arbitration clause.6 These clauses are
commonly snuck into long employment or client contracts with
companies. Although supporters of these arbitration clauses may argue
that it is the fault of the signee for not reading the fine print!the blame
must be shifted onto these large companies.7
1

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 87 (Mary Gregor
et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2012).
2
U.S. Const. amend. VII.
3
See Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
(Oct.
31,
2015),
the Deck of Justice, THE NEW YORK TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywherestacking-the-deck-of-justice.html ("Over the last few years, it has become increasingly
difficult to apply for a credit card, use a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop
online without agreeing to private arbitration. The same applies to getting a job, renting a
car or placing a relative in a nursing home.#).
4
See Congress Must Undo Damage of U.S. Supreme Courts Latest Anti-Consumer
Decision, PUBLIC CITIZEN (May 17, 2011), https://www.citizen.org/news/congress-mustundo-damage-of-u-s-supreme-courts-latest-anti-consumer-decision/ (explaining that the
Federal Arbitration Act was originally "a law whose goal was to help facilitate voluntary
arbitration between businesses#).
5
Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, A Privatization of the
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2015),
Justice
System,
THE
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-ofthe-justice-system.html?module=inline.
6
Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3.
7
See Hearing on H.R. 4960 A Bill to Amend The Securities Exchange of 1934:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Cong. 424 (1988) (statement
of William J. Fitzpatrick, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and SIA).
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While the arbitration procedure can be more efficient than the
traditional rules of litigation, this in turn has a disparate effect on
consumers, small business owners, and employees against the corporate
goliath. These corporations understand that arbitration not only is far less
expensive than traditional litigation, but it is tilted in favor of the big guy.8
Large businesses even have the resources and connections to sway
&  9 This is despite the fact that arbitration
was originally designed to settle claims as discretionary and duly agreed
upon by all involved parties. 10 Thus, arbitration has become a pseudocourtroom that leaves information normally available to the public#in the
shadows.11 These individuals have valid claims that require the attention
and experience that a courtroom can provide in order to equitably decide
the course of action. Further, it is the publicity of trials that can bring
notoriety to claims and warnings of abuse. Yet!$  
brought by single plaintiffs over fraud, wrongful death and rape are now
%12
  " $"
percent of private sector nonunion workers will be blocked from court by
forced arbitration clauses with class- and collective-! %13 For
many individuals, it is now or never. Yet, it is clear that in the past ten
years, the Supreme Court has greatly perverted the original intent of the
Federal Arbitration Act14 only to now read it based on a strict, textualist
theory.15 The Federal Arbitration Act was never intended to be a malleable
tool for large corporations to wield against the rest of the 99%.16 Here, it

8

Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3.
Id. ($[T]he rules of arbitration largely favor companies, which can even steer cases to
friendly arbitrators, interviews and records show.%).
10
See Congress Must Undo Damage, supra note 4.
11
See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration 96 N.C. L.
Rev. 679, 679-81 (2018) (explaining the secrecy that lies within arbitration as compared
with the openness that accompanies public trials).
12
Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3.
13
HAMAJI ET. AL., UNCHECKED CORPORATE POWER 1 (May 2019),
https://www.epi.org/files/uploads/Unchecked-Corporate-Power-web.pdf.
14
See generally Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99,
99-100 (2006) (explaining the new scope and reach of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925).
15
Id. at 157 ($Over the last twenty-five years, the Justices have shown an ability to
misuse both legislative history and textualism to reach their desired result, rather than to
interpret the statute that was enacted.%).
16
See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729-30 (2001).
9
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was the legislature who created this act, but the Court that destroyed it.17
Now, it is time for the Legislature to act and salvage what is left of the
Act.

II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1925
Nearly 100 years ago, arbitration was devised as a mechanism tailored
to businessmen of similar resources that were in fairly simple dispute.18
               
parties agree that one or several individuals can make a decision about the
dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments . . . After the
hearing, the arbitrator iss     19 This definition may seem
straightforward; however, this was the original intent that the legislature
had in mind when crafting the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.20

A. The Original Intent of The Federal Arbitration Act
"Congress was cognizant of how troubling litigation
was for the average businessit bred animosity and emptied pockets.21
Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act sought to alleviate the burdens of the
judicial process by allowing individuals who had contracted together to
solve any issue in a less formal and expedited manner.22 Moreover, the
17

See Congress Must Undo Damage, supra note 4 (It is now clear that a five-justice
majority on the court is committed to turning the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 . . . into
a shield against corporate accountability. ).
18
Garrett Epps, An Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, THE ATLANTIC, (May
22, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-court-decision-onemployment/560963/ (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act was envisioned to
efficiently settle disputes among merchantsbusiness interests with comparable
bargaining power ).
19
Arbitration, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, (date last accessed: January 5, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProc
esses/arbitration/.
20
Moses, supra note 14, at 110-11 (explaining that the Federal Arbitration Act was
intended as a procedural law which allowed a new form of private dispute resolution that
was geared towards simple disputes).
21
See generally id. at 103 ([T]he [original New York State] statute [that served as a
basis for the Federal Arbitration Act] was directed at three evils: (1) long delays caused by
congested courts and excessive motion practice, (2) the expense of litigation, and (3) failure
through litigation to reach a decision as just. ).
22
Id. at 102 (!Arbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money . . . .It preserves
business friendships . . . It raises business standards. It maintains business honor, prevents
unnecessary litigation, and eliminates the law"s delay by relieving our courts." (citing
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the J. Comm. Of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (statement of Julius
Cohen))).
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drafters believed arbitration allowed for equity, but also promoted unity in
the business community even after a dispute.23
As a guide, the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925 provides clear and vivid accounts of the original intent of Congress.24
                   
thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts and admiralty contractsan agreement to arbitrate,
when voluntarily        25 This new
law was designed to address disputes between arms-length, equally-able
bargaining parties that had both mutually agreed to be in a transaction
governed by an arbitration clause.26 The Federal Arbitration Act was
originally not designed to be applicable to most employer-employee
contracts.27 Further, the framers envisioned this bill would provide a
cheaper, more efficient way to deal with non-complex legal disputes.28 The
Legislature recognized that more complicated claims were better off with
the experience and procedural safeguards of the court system.29
Lastly, one of the main goals of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
was to allow businessmen to amicably reconcile even after dealing with
any sort of legal dispute.30 Litigation can be a hostile processas costs
grow, so can contempt. Therefore, the legislature acknowledged a less
formal arena would help to diminish any conflict between the parties
during the lawsuit and after it. Nevertheless, this sort of camaraderie that
was emphasized in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 no longer remains.

B. Supreme Discretion: How The Supreme Court Created A New
Federal Arbitration Act
Despite the basic framework and extensive legislative history of the
Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court, over the past thirty years,
transformed this Act into an unrecognizable tool for the wealthy and

23

Id.
See generally id.
25
Id. at 108 (citing 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924) (emphasis added)).
26
Epps, supra note 18.
27
Moses, supra note 14, at 105-06.
28
Id. at 111.
29
See id. (Arbitration was not the proper method for deciding points of law of major
importance of involving constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes.
These kinds of questions were not within the particular experience of the arbitrators and
thus were better left to the determination of skilled judges with a background of legal
experience and established system of law. (citing Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton,
The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926))).
30
Id. at 102-03.
24
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powerful.31 Originally, arbitration was reserved solely for businessmen in
a transaction.32 Yet, today, arbitration is now enforceable in consumer and
employee contracts.33 Further, this procedural, federal law has been
transformed into a substantive law that is able to preempt state law all the
while dealing with certain, consequential rights such as antitrust and
antidiscrimination statutes.34
The current paradigm began when the Supreme Court greatly
increased the scope of this Act.35         $
            $  
language on its face. Strangely enough, the Supreme Court Justices have
expanded this law liberally all the while interpreting it textually. Although
those two words could not seem further apart, this is what is incredibly
peculiar about this conundrum. Yet, if one takes a step back to look at the
fuller picture, it is clear that this was by design.36
Unbeknownst to the general public, legal masterminds slowly started
to expand the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act in the previous
decades.37 This sort of paradox was driven by large corporations seeking
out one thing: a loophole. Now, consumers and employees alike have little
to no recourse if bound by arbitration clauses.

III. RISE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
$         
Act, yet it is the past ten years that has truly solidified the reach of the
Act.38 In 2011, with AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, the Supreme
Court took a very liberal approach when defining the parameters of the

31

See id. at 157 (!All of the Justices at various points in time lost sight of the purpose
and scope of the legislation or deferred to faulty precedent, creating a far different statute
from the one enacted by Congress."); Epps, supra note 18 (![T]he Court$s conservatives
have reinterpreted the [Federal Arbitration] Act to include what they call a #liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.$").
32
See Epps, supra note 18.
33
Id.; Moses, supra note 14, at 112.
34
See Moses, supra note 14, at 112-13.
35
See Epps, supra note 18 (!This is a judge-made policy invention, reflecting
conservative justice$s empathy for corporations and large employers facing lawsuits by
consumers and employees.").
36
See Moses, supra note 14, at 132 (citing Circuit City Shores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 132 (2001)).
37
See id.
38
See Moses, supra note 14, at 156 (!Despite concerns expressed by members of the
1925 Congress that arbitration not be imposed in a #take-it-or-leave-it$ context, the
Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a statute which permits businesses to do exactly
that.").
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Federal Arbitration Act.39 Yet, it is the ruling in this case that got the ball
rolling. In AT&T Mobility, the Court found it was permissible for contracts
to contain class action waivers within mandatory arbitration clauses. In the
seven years after AT&T Mobility, the Court allowed the Federal
Arbitration Act to preempt state law, limit the Effective Vindication
Doctrine, and take precedence over the National Labor Relations Act of
1935.40 This precedent severely restricts the rights of consumers and
employees alike, all the while, shielding major corporations from any sort
of lawsuit by making the possibility of legal action neither pragmatic nor
possible.41

A. AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion
In 2002, a married couple, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, signed an
agreement with AT&T Mobility, LLC for the corporation to provide
cellphones and a network service in exchange for monthly payments.42
Under the contract, AT&T agreed to supply at no cost the cellphones for
the service provided to its customers.43 However, after the Concepcions
were charged over $30 in sales tax on each phone, they filed a complaint
alleging fraud and false advertising which was later combined in a class
action suit as other customers faced the same situation.44 Because the sales
tax was too low of an amount for many people to individually sue for, class
action was appropriate. This sort of collective action allows for the risk to
be worth the reward for all those wronged.45
However, the original agreement signed between the Concepcions, as
well as many others, and AT&T required mandatory arbitration for any
claims against the company.46 Further, the contract speculated that any
claim must also be brought individually.47 In other words, this agreement
contained a class action waiver clause.
Based on the original service agreement, AT&T filed a motion to
compel arbitration.48 The Concepcions responded that the service contract
39

AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 560 U.S. 1740, 1745 (2011).
See generally Moses, supra note 14, at 112-13.
41
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J.
dissenting) (describing the arbitration clause in American Express contract as impos[ing]
a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of an anti-trust claim a fools errand).
42
Concepcion, 560 U.S. at 1744.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3 ([C]lass-action lawsuits,
realistically [are] the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business
practices.).
46
Concepcion, 560 U.S. at 1744.
47
Id.
48
Id.
40
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&" $" ) $&$( '$ #!( $! ! &
because it disallowed class-& !$!"*49 In response, the District
$!# ," #  ## # !#!# $" in the
contract purposely disfavored class action litigants, thus the contract was
unconscionable.50  # !$# ! # &! $!#," !$
consistent with California law under Discover Bank v. Superior Court.51
The appellate court found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not
supersede California law because the unconscionability measure was in
line with basic contract principle.52 However, upon appeal to the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit
$!#$###!!#!## ! #!,"
state law.53 Justice Scalia noted that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
has a liberal interpretation and the Discover $ !)"##law rules . .  "# "  "# # #  "#  # ,"
#%"*54 ""!##)#'#*55 of the Federal Arbitration
# $"#  "## ## # )+ !!( $! ",  #  " #
+"$! ## !%# !#!# greements are enforced according to
#!#!",*56 ! ,"!""##!&!!!#!#
cases to follow. Without any regard for the terms of the arbitration
agreement, Scalia drove forward the reasoning that the Federal Arbitration
Act was meant to enforce any and all arbitration agreements. In his
counterargument to the dissent, Justice Scalia merely mustered up that
although there may be unrelated, but noteworthy reasons to not allow the
Federal Arbitration Act to preempt state law, this cannot happen as it is
" ()""##&##*57 This sort of posturing of the Federal
Arbitration Act poses the question: How far will this go?
After the widely criticized Concepcion decision, many scholars
recognized the immediate damaging effect not only on the legal field, but
on consumers.58 The Supreme Court opened the gates for little to no
49

Id. at 1745.
Id.
51
Id.; see generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005)
()[T]he law in California is that class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are
unenforceable, whether the consumer is being asked to waive the right to class action
litigation or the right to classwide arbitration.*).
52
Concepcion, 560 U.S. at 1745 (citing Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC., 584 F.3d 849,
857 (2009)).
53
Id. at 1753.
54
Id. at 1748.
55
Id. (referring to Section 2, 3, and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act).
56
Id. (citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
57
Id. at 1753.
58
See generally Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms:
Challenging Anti-Reform Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469,
50
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accountability for large corporations.59 Class action suits promote a large
community of similarly situated consumers to have their day in court when
their claims are too small to be brought individually. Without a class action
option, there is far too much financial risk in going to court or arbitration
individually.60       
out of potential liability by incorporating class action waiver language in
their standard form contracts with consumers . . . 61

B. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
Only two years after the historic decision in AT&T Mobility LLC. v.
Concepcion, the Supreme Court was faced with another class-action
waiver suit: American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. Writing
once again for the majority, Justice Scalia reinforced the broad approach
to interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act and rendered another
consequential decision serving as another huge win for large corporations
and monopolies.
After being exposed to exorbitant fees, business owners filed an
antitrust suit under the Sherman Act of 1890 against the infamous credit
card company, American Express.62 Because these merchants accept
various credit cards, including American Express, at their respective
places of business, these owners are charged certain fees by those credit
card companies.63               
Express used its monopoly power in the market for charge cards to force
merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher than
         64 Yet, similar to Concepcion, a class
                 !   
        ! 65
470 (2015) (predicting the direct effects that class action waivers will have on consumers
such as small-value individual claims are unlikely to be arbitrated . . . [while]
procedurally difficult! claims . . . cannot realistically be brought by individuals in
arbitration).
59
See id. ([B]y merely adding an arbitration clause (containing a class action ban and
an anti-reform provision) to their contracts, corporate entities have seemingly won the right
to cheaply and easily insulate themselves against many forms of privately-enforced legal
liability, and with this, the right to continue engaging in practices that cause widespread
harm, unless and until detected by a public enforcer.).
60
See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3 ([I]t is nearly impossible for one
individual to take on a corporation with vast resources.).
61
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623, 627 (2012).
62
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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After American Express filed a motion to compel arbitration, the
District Court ruled in its favor under the Federal Arbitration Act.66 The
"#!#$!#$&###!#",!" "&!
 ! !# $ ##  !! # "$""$( ) !% # ##!$"#
"*67 # &$ "# )+# "# "%! $! #$" dollars, and
#',&#'$!%!(!individual
#&$ !  &#!*68 On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed and found in favor of the merchants.69 The
# $!# ) ## $se respondents [merchants] had
"#" ## +#( &$ $! prohibitive costs if compelled to
!#!#$!#""#&%!,#&%!&"$!
#!#!#$# !*70
Eventually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and later vacated and
remanded the case in accordance with the Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal
    decision.71 On remand, the Second Circuit found in favor
of the merchants on two separate occasions.72 For a second time, the Court
granted certiorari. Upon review by the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia,
$##)###!$"#&"#$!#! !$!
###%#%!(*73 Despite the findings that show
the huge expense and little reward of individually going to arbitration, the
majority failed to acknowledge the consequences of this decision. Justice
%&#"!""()######"#&orth
the expense involving in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute
the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy*74 Even though no
rational individual would choose to arbitrate when the costs would greatly
exceed the reward, the Court did not find that fact to be a legitimate reason
to invalidate these arbitration clauses. Thus, the design has once again
succeeded as procedurally the claimants may have an avenue to which to
proceed upon; however, it is simply not feasible nor practical. These

66

Id.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. (citing In re American Express Merchants, Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 315-316
(C.A.2 2009)).
71
Id.; see generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animals Feeds Int,l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1775 (holding )a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so*).
72
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (describing how the Second Circuit actually found
in favor for the merchants on remand and once more during a third rehearing in light of the
AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion decision).
73
Id. at 2309.
74
Id. at 2311.
67
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decisions no longer represent a tendency to favor arbitration; this is about
silencing claims.
Underlying this momentous decision in Italian Colors, are the
remnants of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine. The Effective Vindication
" &  !ed as a means of ensuring that arbitration is an
effective mechanism for vindicating federal statutory rights, the doctrine
  $    '75 However,
Italian Colors reflects a suppression of this doctrine as the majority
&!-vindication challenges to situations where an arbitration
agreement precludes the assertion of certain statutory rights and cases
"   !   (   
access to the forum   )'76 As Justice Kagan explains in the
&#      $%even if it has
in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to
insist on a contract effectively depriving its victi   '77

C. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
Justice Gorsuch begins the Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis majority
 $" &   $ $ 
allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through
one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring
their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with
$'78   &   
policy these questions are surely debatable. But as a matter of law the
" '79
In 2018, the case law was clear. However, the precedent was built
upon a series of flawed interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925.80 Similar to Concepcion and Italian Colors, the plaintiffs in Epic
75

Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication
Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 375 (2014); see also Am.
Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (&[T]he effective-vindication rule%
[was created] to prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff)s ability to enforce
congressionally created rights. That doctrine bars applying such a clause when (but only
when) it operates to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims.').
76
Chukwumerije, supra note 75, at 377-78 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013)).
77
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2313.
78
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
79
Id.
80
See generally David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87
IND. L.J. 239, 251 (2012) (&The story of FAA jurisprudence since 1983 has been one of
justices unwittingly backing themselves into an untenable position and then failing to
perceive even a need to find a way out.'); Maureen Weston, The Death of Class Action
After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 773 (2012) (characterizing the Supreme Court)s
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Systems Corp. v. Lewis had agreed to arbitrate individually any claims
against the company.81 However, the plaintiffs in the current case were not
customers of this corporation. They were employees.82
In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act was enacted in order to
protect the interests of workers and their right to gather against abusive or
harmful practices by employers.83         
framing of the question, the central issue at the core of this case was
                
bargaining enumerated in the National Labor Relations Act simply by
contracting out of it. Unfortunately, according to Epic Systems, companies
now can.84

1. A Fractured History Is The Leading Precedent
A great deal of the majority opinion in Epic Systems resembles the
arguments of Concepcion and Italian Colors.85 In Epic Systems, Justice
Gorsuch begins the majority opinion by describing a distorted history of
the Federal Arbitration Act.86         
Federal Arbitration Act in Concepcion, the majority opinion focused
narrowly on the utmost importance of enforcing arbitration agreements all
the while describing the vast plane in which the Act covers.87 Here, the
majority disingenuously emphasized that the framers and drafters of the
Act intended for all arbitration agreemen       
    88
Disguised as an effort to enforce the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court
turned a blind eye to the National Labor Relations Act. Justice Gorsuch
rationalized that indeed when one looks closer at Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, there is no conflict of laws between this act and the
decisions as an infatuation with arbitration (citing Jeffrey Stempel, Tainted Love: An
Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent
Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795 (2012))).
81
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1621.
82
Id. at 1619-20.
83
National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, (last accessed
January 5, 2020), https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-relations-act.
84
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (reversing the lower court s decision and holding
that the arbitration agreements are in fact enforceable in this case).
85
Compare with id. at 1621 with AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 560 U.S. 333
1740, 1745 (2011) and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308-09
(2013).
86
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1621.
87
Id.
88
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2); but see infra Section II.A. (illustrating the original intent
of the framers and drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act and the focus on voluntariness,
similar situated business interests, and non-complex issues such as those that dealt with
protected rights).
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Federal Arbitration Act.89 Here, the Court reasoned, Section 7 merely
                     
collection action proced90 However, the National Labor Relations
Act was passed into law twenty-one years before Rule 23 of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs modern class action suits.91 Thus, the Court would be mistaken to
immediate write off the intent of the framers of the National Labor
Relations Act by not including something that simply was not an issue at
the time. Here, it is obvious that the collective bargaining would in fact
include class or collection action procedures as this the main goal of the
framers of the National Labor Relations Act: promote unity against a
tyrannical system.92

2. A Means To An End
Epics Systems represents a culmination of a seven-year project: a
means to an end. The combined result of AT&T Mobility, Italian Colors,
and Epic Systems is the empowerment of large corporations over
consumers, small business owners, and now employees. Because of these
decisions, simply inserting a mandatory arbitration clause with a class
action waiver will make the costs of litigation and the chance of an
individual filing a claim nearly disappear.93 By overriding the National
Labor Standards Act, there is little to no recourse for an employee when
an employer violates basic rights.94 Celine McNicholas, the Director of
Governmental Affairs at the Economic Policy Institute, acknowledges that
Epic Systems               
impossible for millions of workers to get justice when their employers

89

Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
Id. at 1624.
91
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
92
Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1633-34 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (Congress aim in . . .
the NLRA to place employers and employees on a more equal footing . . . .[T]he NLRA
operate[s] on a different premise, that employees must have the capacity to act collectively
in order to match their employers clout in setting terms and conditions of employment.);
Epps, supra note 18 ([A] judge could read the NLRA to bar employer-imposed contracts
requiring individual arbitration . . . Under the NLRA, these clauses could be considered as
unfairly restricting other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or
protection. That doesnt do violence to the FAA; its text explicitly allows an exception
when contracts violate grounds as in exist in law.).
93
Gilles, supra note 58, at 470.
94
See Epps, supra note 18 (noting that these clauses make it easier for employers to
maintain unfair or even unlawful employment structures and salary systems); see also
One Year Since Epic Systems v. Lewis, Arbitration is on the Rise, ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE (May 21, 2019), https://www.epi.org/press/one-year-since-epic-systems-vlewis-arbitration-is-on-the-rise/.
90
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       95 put into place by Congress.
Even if arbitration is still a viable option, it is behind closed doors and
there is no public accountability.96 Furthermore, because the cost usually
greatly outweighs the incentive to arbitrate, arbitration is a losing battle
for each individual.97
As Justice Ginsburg reflects upon in her dissent in Epic Systems,
         employees ordinarily
                98 As a foreseeable
consequence of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, corporations have begun to
            
small minority of American workers will be able to sue [in court] their
 99 In essence, Epic Systems represents the final nail in the
coffin for claims by employees and consumers alike.

IV. THE FUTURE HARM OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
A. The Supreme Court Decisions Continue To Sabotage
Arbitration
Arbitration clauses may be on the rise, but the integrity of arbitration
is in jeopardy.100 Although this may seem counterintuitive as an onslaught
of arbitration clauses and class action waivers are being injected in nearly
every consumer and employee contract, arbitration is only hurt by these
decisions.101 The Court has focused on the fact that although arbitration
may not be the preferred route of many plaintiffs, it is still an option that
does not intrude upon the Effective Vindication of their claims.102 But in
actuality, mandatory arbitration clauses have transformed arbitration into
  -suppressing arbitration . . . .designed and intended to suppress
95

One Year Since Epic Systems, supra note 94.
See Estlund, supra note 11, at 102 (While it is important not to overstate the contrast
between arbitration and litigation, there is no doubt that much more of the arbitral process
is shielded from public view.).
97
See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3.
98
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1640 (2018).
99
One Year Since Epic Systems, supra note 94.
100
Adam Raviv, Too Darn Bad: How the Supreme Courts Class Arbitration
Jurisprudence Has Undermined Arbitration, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 220, 221 (2014)
([A]lthough the Courts recent class arbitration decisions have nominally favored
arbitration by upholding particular arbitration provisions, in fact the rulings may ultimately
undermine the use of arbitration as an efficient, flexible means of resolving disputes both
in the U.S. and internationally.).
101
Id.
102
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (describing
that although the arbitration remedy is expensive, it still exists for the plaintiff).
96
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 &!)103 By design, arbitration clauses have
been carefully woven in between the lines of lengthy contracts. On the
surface, it may seem that large corporations incorporate these clauses
because arbitration has the tendency to favor the company over the
individual in the proceedings'yet, it is the fact that these individuals
would rather forego their claim entirely that makes arbitration such an
enticing option for these companies.104 With each and every landmark
decision by the Supreme Court, the rights of consumers and employees
have been chipped away at. Yet, it truly was the class-wide waivers that
had the most pernicious effect.

B. Decline of Class Actions
More than a decade in the making, the move to block class
actions was engineered by a Wall Street-led coalition of
credit card companies and retailers, according to
interviews with coalition members and court records.
Strategizing from law offices on Park Avenue and in
Washington, members of the group came up with a plan
to insulate themselves from the costly lawsuits. Their
work culminated in two Supreme Court rulings, in 2011
and 2013, that enshrined the use of class-action bans in
contracts. The decisions drew little attention outside legal
circles, even though they upended decades of
jurisprudence put in place to protect consumers and
employees.105
The downfall of class action suits began long ago. However, it was
Concepcion that began the paradigm shift that would soon follow in 2013
   " # & & (   "   
political branches, the class action for consumer and employment claims
)106
  ! * *Italian Colors that there is still
 %    $"     * 107, no
reasonable individual would lose thousands upon thousands of dollars to
go up against the corporation.108 (% 
103

Schwartz, supra note 80, at 240.
See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3.
105
Id.
106
Schwartz, supra note 80, at 266.
107
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
108
See Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United
UNIV.
SCH.
L.,
1,
1
States,
DUKE
https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf ((Use of the courts to assert
104
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    ! 109 Class actions suits are important in the context
of holding the corporation publicly accountable for its violations. Further,
           perhaps only a few dollars, or
even less. But in the aggregate, these small individual harms may yield
  !110 Thus, although it may seem pedantic to sue over
such seemingly trivial amounts, these companies are the ones gaining so
much from this exploitation. Similar to the tax charged on the telephones
in Concepcion or credit card transaction fees in Italian Colors, the
individual amount may not seem significant enough to litigate over. Yet,
it is the initial abuse in the first place that is bothersome. By slowly
gathering these seemingly minor profits, these companies are opening the
door to more blatant abuse.
As Concepcion, Italian Colors, and Epic Systems demonstrates, the
Supreme Court has let the corporations define who can sue them, or if they
can be sued at all. This loophole was created by design under the theory
t       "         
induce them to accept lower settlements or even drop their claims
!111 It is this type of practice that allows claims to be suppressed,
rather than arbitrated. For example, an employee may see it more
worthwhile to keep her job while enduring violations of certain protections
rather than being further exploited in a closed-door hearing that would eat
up her entire life savings. By keeping all claims in the hands of the
individual rather than in a class-wide dispute, the corporations are
cognizant of the implications of less employees seeing the cause of action
        ! 
never been more ominous as it is in these precarious times.

V. SOLUTION
"       
on large corporations has seemingly sealed the fate for anyone legally
obliged to a contract with a mandatory arbitration clause and a class action
waiver. For many, it may seem like all hope is lost. Nevertheless, there
have been strides in the Federal Arbitration Act reform in light of these
rights is practicable only if the potential benefits exceed the cost . . . Claims that are too
small . . . will not be pursued. No matter what rights may be written in the substantive law,
if there is no means by which those rights can be enforced the law might as well not exist,
for it can be violated with impunity.!).
109
Jean R. Sternlight and Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 75, 85 (2004).
110
Cooper Alexander, supra note 108, at 1.
111
Id. at 86.
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three catastrophic Supreme Court decisions.112 The Court has gone too far
in its interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act to even attempt to
backtrack now. Hence, the duty has been passed onto both Congress and
the companies imposing these mandatory arbitration clauses. It is time for
to change, whether it be a new bill signed into law or the end of contracts
written with such clauses,no matter how lucrative it may be for the
corporation to keep such stipulations in place.

A. The Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act: A Step In The
Right Direction
Throughout the years, there has been numerous attempts to amend,
update, or repeal the Federal Arbitration Act.113 The most recent endeavor
to legislate arbitration clauses came in the form of House Resolution 1423,
or better known as the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (FAIR
Act).114 -" $'!%    ' "' ''& #(& #
Representations passed the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (the
-  '.   &"'# !"'!"'#%+%'%'#"
agreements and class action waivers in future employment, consumer,
"''%(&'#%) %'&&$('&.115 The bill states:
The purposes of this Act are to,
(1) prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration of
future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes; and
(2) prohibit agreements and practices that interfere with the right of
individuals, workers, and small businesses to participate in a joint, class,
or collective action related to an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil
rights dispute.116
In response to the FAIR Act, the White House released a statement of
administrative policy rebuking this latest action by the House.117 The
' #(&  ! -'&  "' $%#'#"& *  "%&
litigation, costs, and inefficiency, including by exposing the vast majority
112
See Jean R. Sternlight, Introduction: Dreaming About Arbitration Reform, 8 NEV. L.J.
1, 3-4 (2007), http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/282 (discussing various attempts to
reform the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 in response to the Supreme Court/s decisions).
113
See id.
114
Murray B. Silverstein, Proposed Legislation to Invalidate Arbitration Agreements
and Class Action Waivers Passes HouseNow in Senate, GREENSPOON MARDER
CONSUMER
FINANCE
BLOG,
(Oct.
22,
2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e0539852-c73c-482a-8543df489e509295.
115
Id.
116
H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr1423/BILLS116hr1423rfs.pdf.
117
EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ST. OF ADMIN. POL/Y, (2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SAP_HR-1423.pdf.
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of businesses to even more unnecessary litigation. As written, the FAIR
Act disregards the benefits of resolving disputes through arbitration,
including lower costs, faster resolution, and reduced burden on the
!$&118 Ironically enough, the White House concluded its statement
 %  $     !     #! ! 
! "$!$    &119
     !' !         # $
result in a slew of litigation120, it failed to recognize all the suits already in
the courts fighting against arbitration clauses themselves. Therein lies the
hypocrisy in this entire façade that mandatory arbitration actually speeds
up the judicial process.121 Furthermore, even if there is an arbitration case
that may be a quicker resolution to a litigation proceeding this does not
mean it is an equitable resolution.122 It is obvious that supporters of the
current paradigm value time saved rather than justice prevailed. The White
!'      !   !    $
arbitration.123 However, it is this efficiency fallacy that continues to persist
despite numerous examples of arbitration as an unjust system.124
"   !'  reform to the current system
will only increase unnecessary litigation fails to give proper weight to the
merits of each case that is strong-armed into arbitration. It is obvious that
many individuals with a valid claim forgo arbitration due to the costs
associated and the lack of reward.125 If anything, the White House is

118

Id.
Id.
120
Id.
121
See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1312 (2009) (%However, if one compares all case dispositions in the two forumsincluding settlements, pretrial dismissals, and the like-the average time to disposition may
well be shorter in litigation than arbitration.&).
122
See id. at 1339-40 (explaining that although the court system may very well have full
dockets, the arbitration system has shown time and time again to be %pro-[corporate]
defendant&).
123
See
Using
Arbitration
to
Resolve
Legal
Disputes,
FINDLAW,
https://adr.findlaw.com/arbitration/using-arbitration-to-resolve-legal-disputes.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2019) (%Arbitration is generally considered a more efficient process than
litigation because it is quicker, less expensive, and provides greater flexibility of process
and procedure.&).
124
Schwartz, supra note 121, at 1340-41 (explaining that there is %no evidence that it
[mandatory arbitration] is fair&).
125
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON.
POLICY INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-ofmandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-millionamerican-workers/ (%Research has found that employees are less likely to win arbitration
cases and they recover lower damages in mandatory employment arbitration than in the
courts.&).
119
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protecting large companies, not the workers or consumers.126 By insulating
these large companies from future lawsuits, the Court, the White House,
and other mandatory arbitration supporters are only saving these
corporations significant damages that they would otherwise be likely
ordered to pay.127 It is not that these consumers or employees are wasting
 '! #it is the entire system that has
silenced valid claims.128

B. The Digital Influence
Though large corporations seem to be the true winner out of this
system, many companies are now removing pre-dispute arbitration clauses
from its consumer and employee contracts. One of the largest supporters
of the FAIR Act was Google.129 Google threw its support behind this bill
  $   "  
in Google offices located in 50 cities worldwide walked out for real change
at 11:10am local time protesting sexual harassment, misconduct, lack of
  "  !  '! "%130
     !  $          
harassment and discrimination for all current and future employees, along
with a right for every Google worker to bring a co-worker, representative,
or supporter of their choosing when meeting with HR, especially when
    %131 Here it is obvious that Google recognized
that mandatory arbitration clauses not only hurt its workers, but these
clauses were hurting its own internal operations.132
On the other hand, companies that have neglected to take
accountability into its own hands have faced challenges in this
increasingly digital world. After news broke that a prominent law firm
126

See id.
See id.
128
See Silver-Greenberg and Corkery, supra note 5; see also Silver-Greenberg and
Gebeloff, supra note 3 (describing how $[s]ome state judges have called the class-action
bans a &get out of jail free' card, because it is nearly impossible for one individual to take
on a corporation with vast resources%).
129
Colin Lecher, Google Organizers Join Lawmakers in Arbitration Fight, THE VERGE,
(Feb. 28, 2019, 12:40 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/28/18244752/googleorganizers-fair-act-bill-forced-arbitration.
130
Google Employees and Contractors Participate In Global Walkout For Real
Change, MEDIUM, (Nov. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@GoogleWalkout/googleemployees-and-contractors-participate-in-global-walkout-for-real-change-389c65517843.
131
Id.
132
See Lecher, supra note 129; see also Colin Lecher, Google Will End Forced
Arbitration
For
Employees
In
All
Disputes,
(Feb.
21,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/21/18235205/google-forced-arbitration-employeedisputes.
127
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included a clause in its contract for summer associates which required
arbitration for any claim including Title VII sexual harassment claims,
there was immediate backlash.133 Shortly after an uproar on social media,
the firm tweeted it would no longer include a pre-dispute arbitration clause
in its contracts for summer associates nor any other employee.134
Over a year later, another prestigious law firm was in the news over
the controversial arbitration issue.135 Yet, this time, this firm was
proactively removing mandatory arbitration clauses from its employeremployee contracts.136 Taking cues from Google, the firm released the
news in a statement that focused on the needs of the employees.137 In an
era of increased public accountability, these businesses are quickly
realizing that although money can be saved through arbitration and
silencing claims, this, in turn, will only have a negative effect. Employees
are the foundation of any good business. By taking advantage of
employees in the form of arbitration clauses, these companies are quickly
facing repercussions both within its own organization and through the
web. Critics of mandatory arbitration clauses are taking to social media to
publish which organizations still require its employees to sign this sort of
clauses as a warning to applicants.138       
reach, large companies either must respond or face the press. Thus, the
onus is on these companies as well as Congress to start making active
changes not only to employment contracts, but also to company-client
agreements.

VI. CONCLUSION
Almost 100 years after the creation of the Federal Arbitration Act, the
Supreme Court has completely transformed the Act from its humble
beginnings. The Federal Arbitration Act merely sought to allow arbitration
agreements to be enforceable as any other contract. This bill was intended
to ease the judicial process for merchants of similar means to resolve any
133

Staci Zaretsky, Biglaw Firm Tries To Force Summer Associates To Arbitrate Sexual
THE
LAW,
(Mar.
26,
2018),
Harassment
Claims,
ABOVE
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/biglaw-firm-tries-to-force-summer-associates-toarbitrate-sexual-harassment-claims/.
134
Id.
135
Kathryn Rubino, Another Elite Law Firm Kicks Mandatory Arbitration To The Curb,
Above the Law, (Sept. 20, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/09/another-elite-lawfirm-kicks-mandatory-arbitration-to-the-curb/?rf=1.
136
Id.
137
See id.
138
See generally Fighting For All To Be Free From Coercive Contacts, PEOPLES PARITY
PROJECT, https://www.peoplesparity.org/coercivecontracts/ (demonstrating the amount of
law firms that still require mandatory arbitration clauses in employee-employer contracts).
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dispute quickly and effectively. Instead of waiting around for the clogged
courts to intervene, these businessmen wanted a simpler dispute
resolution. However, the Federal Arbitration Act has been manipulated in
order to essentially phase out class action lawsuits and silence claims.139
Although the Court seems to prefer arbitration, it is actually making
arbitration in these suits meaningless.
   
        
the Federal Arbitration Act, both Congress and corporations alike need to
act. First, Congress should pass either the FAIR Act or a similar bill that
either amends or replaces the Federal Arbitration Act. This piece of
legislation should clearly outline in its text the original intentions of the
drafters and framers of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. For example,
the new legislation should include a requirement for mutual consent and
voluntariness. Further, corporations must have more accountability. As
employees, consumers, and critics take a stand against these companies
there will far more pressure on these institutions to act in the best interests
of its signee. However, as each day passes by, another claim is silenced.
By forcing arbitration, the consumer or employee may opt to not follow
through with the claim. Thus, the claim disappears. Another win for the
corporate leviathan.

139

See Congress Must Undo Damage, supra note 4 (It is now clear that a five-justice
majority on the [C]ourt is committed to turning the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925  a law
whose goal was to help facilitate voluntary arbitration between businesses  into a shield
against corporate accountability.).

